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LESSONS LEARNED ESTABLISHING THE
TITAN IVB LAUNCH SYSTEM CAPABILITY
by
Daniel C. McAlister, Launch Operations Manager
Lockheed Martin / Launch Operations

Titan IVB 33 Launch
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Introduction
On October 15th, 1997 at 08451Z the Titan IVB-33 / TC-21 booster launched the Cassini spacecraft on the start of its journey to study the planet Saturn and its moons. This was the largest
planetary spacecraft ever launched to the outer planets and was the second successful launch
of the new heavy lift Titan IVB (TIVB) booster. The Titan IVB first mission had been launched
earlier in the year, February 24th. This new booster reflected the most significant change in US
launch capability since the launch of the first Space Shuttle and the effort involved was comparable to the Shuttle Return to Flight Mission in 1989. In short, the efforts leading to the first two
TIVB missions required a significant number of firsts. This paper addresses the lessons learned
bringing on such a new and powerful launch capability. The launch base team processed new
generation flight hardware, utilized new processing facilities or modified existing facilities,
established new ground electrical checkout systems, brought the new system on-line in parallel
with existing systems, and established new range support capabilities.

Background
The Titan IVB now has demonstrated the capability to deliver 12,700 pounds to a geostationary
orbit. The polar orbit capability (to be flown in 1999) will be greater than 39,000 pounds. The
Titan IVB flies four basic configurations: two upper stage configurations from the East Coast
and two no upper stage (NUS) configurations from Vandenberg AFB, Ca. The first Titan IVB (24) flew a Boeing provided Inertial Upper Stage (IUS) for transfer of the payload to geostationary orbit while the second TIVB (-33) used the Centaur upper stage for park orbit injection and
injection into interplanetary transfer. The Titan IVB was built on the existing Titan IVA configuration and as such was not a completely new vehicle. Figure 2 describes the new launch vehicle.
The Titan IVB core vehicle had a complete upgrade in avionics but still flew the basic structure
and used the same Aerojet provided hypergol engines. The solid rocket motor strap-ons
(SRMU - Solid Rocket Motor Upgrade) were of a completely new vintage and the first TIVB flight
culminated a challenging development program. The upper stage and the payload fairing
(PLF), used for the Titan IVB vehicles, have minimal changes from the “A” version.

“B” Vehicle Summary
Figure 2

A. Vehicle Description
The basic Titan IV configuration consists of the liquid core vehicle, two solid strap-on rocket
motors, an upper stage (if required), and a PLF. The flight stack is complete with the addition of
the spacecraft to be delivered and these four basic components. Figure 3 provides a summary
of vehicle processing flows and the facilities utilized at Cape Canaveral.

Vehicle Processing Flow & Facilities

Figure 3

B. SRMU.
The two solid strap-ons reflected a significant improvement in reliability and a significant increase in Titan IV throw weight. The SRMU features a three segment composite case design.
The motors are 112.4 feet in length and 10.5 feet in diameter. Each motor develops 1.7 million
pounds of thrust and has a design specific impulse of 285.6 seconds. A better mass fraction of
the new case design and newer propellants resulted in a 25% increase in lift capability. Fewer
field joints, dual o-ring seals, advanced production process controls, and improved operational
facilities all result in higher reliability of the SRMU system. This portion of the Titan IVB is
described in Figure 4.

Figure 4

C. New Ground AGE.
The major upgrade in the aerospace ground equipment (AGE) area was the Programmable
Aerospace Ground Equipment or PAGE. This effort resulted from the consolidation of numerous other systems that were used for the “A” vehicle. The processors, communications equipment, peripherals, and other electrical components may be described as follows. As with “A”
vehicles, van sets were created to travel with the vehicle to the pad. For “B” vehicles, the equipment is consolidated in one van compared to two in the past. The vans provide power and
signal interface between the vehicle and the ground as well as some monitor capability on
system performance. A class “A” redundant ring wrap 100-Mbps fiber optics communications
network was established to tie all parts of the PAGE suite together. Control and monitor consoles allowed for insight into vehicle processing and real time data evaluation. The majority of
testing involved preprogrammed sequences that were run against the vehicle. In many cases
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) hardware / software was used to minimize cost and maximize
flexibility. Significant capability was developed for archiving data, evaluating data (including
trends), and processing information. The system was designed to fail operational / fail safe.

D. Advanced Avionics.
In terms of avionics, the TIVB is a new vehicle. The Guidance Control Unit (GCU) incorporates
ring laser gyros and a new flight computer for navigation, flight control, and overall system
control. The Digital Data Acquisition System (DDAS) provides for a high capability telemetry
downlink, 864 Kbps, and in sync with a new S-band transmitter provides for higher reliability.
There is a new Wideband Instrumentation System (WIS) that provides for increased vehicle

performance measurement capability. There are many new flight safety components and special efforts that focused on eliminating range safety waivers and making the vehicle as close to
possible a Range Safety 127-1 compliant vehicle. There is a complete upgrade to the flight
batteries and there is a new power distribution system. In a few instances, there is carry over
from the “A” vehicle, but for all practical purposes this is a completely new vehicle electrically.

Major Initiatives / Lessons Learned.
A. Programmable Aerospace Checkout Equipment (PAGE).
A complete suite of ground electronics was developed and used to checkout and launch the
Titan IVB. An equipment van travels with the vehicle and provides the interface to the vehicle for
power, subsystem and system testing, telemetry, command, and system redundancy. The
ground electrical equipment installation and checkout represented a considerable effort: processors for telemetry processing, stimulus to the vehicle, systems for archiving great quantities of
data, hardware and software tools for evaluating data, equipment to configure the checkout
suite, and interface to a new set of avionics for flight. This effort went very well in some aspects
but challenges occurred in other areas. The design entity, Lockheed Martin Astronautics (LMA)
-Denver, used a hi-fidelity flight vehicle electrical / mechanical simulation tied in with a hi-fidelity
PAGE suite to validate the PAGE configuration, operating software, test sequences, and the
interface to the new suite of avionics. This set-up, known as the Launch Operations Support
Center (LOSC), was invaluable in the first time processing and launch. Even though some
minor problems occurred, the vehicle checkout process went exceptionally smooth. Note that
Launch Operations crews wrote procedures for vehicle checkout at the launch base and then
took them to the LOSC (Denver) for validation. The LOSC turned out to be an excellent training
tool as well as enhancing first time processing of the Titan IVB.
LESSON LEARNED #1.
When bringing on a new ground checkout system of some complexity, it is well worth the effort
to have a hi-fidelity simulator for both ground and airborne systems at the design center.
Even though the LOSC enhanced vehicle checkout and activation of the new system, it
was not a perfect simulation. The majority of problems that occurred at the launch site were a
direct result of “less than perfect” fidelity of the LOSC. The LOSC simulated the flight vehicle
and a PAGE suite and some ground electronics, but did not simulate with hi-fidelity the interfaces with the Titan transporter and the van that travels with the vehicle. This lower fidelity
simulation area saw the majority of launch base corrective action when things did not go right
the first time. For example, the first time that the van, the PAGE suite, and the transporter
interfaces were tested and validated was at the launch base. That activity today (having been
done several times) takes between two and three weeks. The first time effort at the Cape took
almost three months.
LESSON LEARNED #2.
If within fiscal constraints, the design organizations’ ground simulation should be of the highest
possible fidelity. If the simulation is of lower fidelity, launch base personnel should plan extra
time for activation and testing.
This was the first new ground electronics system that was brought on-line for the Titan in
over 15 years. During the history of the program, there has always been a conscious effort to

maintain a ground configuration in a stable state, so that launch engineers would have a “technically” stable base through vehicle processing and launch. With current computer technology
and new open architecture systems, the concept of “freezing” the ground configuration is very
difficult to do (impossible). Checkout capabilities are vastly improved but “old school” engineers
need to be ready for a paradigm shift!

B. Solid Rocket Motor Upgrade (SRMU)
The SRMU processing effort represented many new first time activities at the launch base. A
high fidelity mechanical Pathfinder was used to validate the processing of some components
and processes in the SMARF (Solid Motor Assembly & Readiness Facility). This included
receiving and inspection (composite cases are ultrasonically tested after transport), installation
of raceway brackets, validation of handling equipment, dummy ordnance installation, handling of
large loads, and utilization of other aerospace ground equipment (AGE). The Pathfinder effort
was extremely valuable and highlighted numerous minor concerns that enhanced processing of
the first SRMU flight set. Cost constraints limited the fidelity of the SRMU Pathfinder to a mechanical operation only. For instance, there was not a complete thrust vector control (TVC)
system nor were there any electrical simulation involved with the Pathfinder operation. In such a
complex and large operation, it would be expected to have problems in those areas where a
lower fidelity pathfinder was chosen. As anticipated, these areas experienced the most significant problems. First time mechanical and electrical processing of the flight hardware resulted in
the largest and most severe problems. For example, after several vehicles have been processed, the time to perform off-line integrated electrical checkout of an SRMU is less than a
week. The first time this effort was attempted at the launch base, it required almost two months
to complete.
LESSON LEARNED #3:
The long term benefit of a high fidelity Pathfinder always has long term dividends that justify the
cost. In today’s low budget environment, Pathfinders should occur. If not of high fidelity, a
careful analysis of potential problems (not caught by low fidelity simulators) should be made.
Time should be added accordingly for first time processing.
The SRMU is a large rocket that requires a 500 ton crane to lift a fully assembled bottle
for mating with the core vehicle. See figure 5. These lifts, in excess of 800,000 pounds are
quite a challenge.
If these lifts are not the heaviest in the history of the aerospace business,
they are close. During lift and transport of such a heavy load, it is critical that the cranes have
capabilities and reliabilities commensurate with hoist and transport of high vehicle value and
also with hardware of significant explosive capability. An extraordinary number of challenges
occurred in bringing on the 500 and 220 ton-capable cranes in the SMARF. A complete discussion of those problems would require numerous papers in themselves.

LESSON LEARNED #4.
There is minimal expertise in this country on cranes that are involved with very heavy lift of
hazardous high value flight hardware. If you require this cap- ability for future operations,
anticipate and plan well.

SRMU LIFTING OPERATION
Fig. 5

C. Integrated Avionics Testing.
After the first vehicle had run through basic checkout at SLC-40, and in anticipation of spacecraft mate, a series of tests was run to validate the electrical integrity of the vehicle and its
interface to the external environment at Cape Canaveral Air Station. Umbilical Drop Tests (UDT)
were conducted to validate that the umbilical pull sequence at T-0 would not impact overall
vehicle performance. Such events can be simulated at the factory , at significant expense, but a
high fidelity simulation is difficult to obtain. These tests were not performed at the factory and
the Cape UDT validated umbilical pull for the first time. No significant problems were encountered and vehicle design was validated. During the Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) testing, the vehicle and the tower were instrumented and the vehicle was exercised, with range
radars radiating the vehicle. A significant amount of effort went into preparing for the tests;
providing test equipment, documenting valid criteria, exercising the various configurations
(including tower moves), and in evaluating the data post test. Only minor discrepancies were
noted. After this sequence of tests, the vehicle design, manufacturing processes, and integration were deemed acceptable. In anticipation of these UDT and EMC tests, considerable discussion took place as to whether or not these tests were required. It was argued that a thorough engineering analysis could have been used to validate the requirements demonstrated in
the UDT and EMC tests thus saving resources and schedule time at the launch base. The
results from this testing, in concert with an effective design, validated a complex vehicle with a
completely new set of avionics.
LESSON LEARNED # 5.
For future launch systems, first time umbilical drop and electromagnetic compatibility tests are
not required. Validation of the electrical integrity of the vehicle and interface to the external
environment can be performed by analysis.

D. Range Support:
With the advent of a significant new launch system, the support requirements levied on the 45th
Space Wing and support contractors must be reviewed and documented. The “A” Titan IV range
support model was valid for much of the support but a number of range support requirements
still had to be addressed. A new Program Requirements Document (PRD) was submitted and
the range support team went through the process of documenting capability and providing
support Two areas are of special note, the new telemetry system on the “B” vehicles, DDAS,
and the special capabilities developed by the 45th Space Wing in support of range safety requirements. First, support was provided for a new complex high data rate telemetry system.
This effort went extremely well for a first-time capability. This included support for closed and
open loop RF testing and all telemetry events for launch. Second, the Laser Illumination System
(LIS) and the Range Safety Advisory System (RSAS) were brought on-line to support the
unique safety requirements of the Cassini mission, a nuclear power source (plutonium). During
a night launch, it was very difficult for range sensors (overcome glare) to know if the TVC system
had failed hard over and was going to drive the vehicle into the ground. This failure scenario
was very unlikely but had the slight potential for plutonium release. The LIS and RSAS insured
the destruct officers in the range would be aware of off-nominal vehicle flight immediately after
ignition. This capability was also brought on-line smoothly and with minimal problems. In both
cases, requirements were identified as early as possible with continuous follow-up. Telemetry
requirements were documented early by “B” vehicle design engineers and “best understood”
range support requirements were provided to the 45th Space Wing early on in the design. A
continuous 3-way dialogue occurred between vehicle design, vehicle processing engineers, and

with range support entities. Changes in vehicle design, and accordingly, changes in range
support requirements were worked on a continuous basis. This same kind of teamwork was
exhibited with the development of the LIS and RSAS.
LESSON LEARNED #6.
Early documentation of range support requirements plus a continual dialogue with range support organizations optimizes the ability of the 45th Space Wing to provide support and to minimize implementation problems.

E. Facilities & Logistics:
The key new facilities for Titan IVB were the Solid Motor Assembly & Readiness Facility
(SMARF) and Space Launch Complex (SLC)-40. The SMARF was specifically designed for the
SRMU and there were minimal problems in utilizing this facility for processing, the notable
exception being the discussion above on cranes. Of course, the SRMU Pathfinder effort was
used to validate this facility. SLC-40 upgrade was fully completed in the spring of 1993 and the
requirements of the Titan IVB stack were factored in. Again, there were minimal facility problems with the vehicle interface at SLC-40. Logistics encompasses a very broad subject and this
paper touches on one small area. There is a great number of minor equipment and tools required to process a space launch vehicle. Lifting fixtures, handling rings, harnesses, electrical
splicing tools, electrical meters, battery activation devices, and torque wrenches are just a few
examples of a very long list. Within LMA, a closed loop process exists to ensure that there are
no “misses” in these areas. Requirements are identified, suitable tools identified or designed,
equipment is purchased or manufactured, equipment is calibrated, provided to the using technician or engineer, and then feedback traced to the design requirement. The problem with the
first Titan IVB is that this process was given lower priority than the big items such as flight
hardware design and production. As a result, problems occurred when these tools were needed
and not necessarily available. Some overtime was utilized, workarounds established, and extra
money spent in making sure the Titan IVB first mission was supported.
LESSON LEARNED # 7.
In the early phases of a program, the test tools must be given adequate priority with all the rest
of the system design. The author suggests an accounting of test tool progress at Critical Design
Review from a design perspective and from an availability perspective. Progress should be
tracked as initial launch base milestones are approached.

F. Management Structure.
The Titan IVB capability was brought on line by the same team and organizational structure that
was responsible for processing and launching the “A” vehicles. Some discussions occurred
early on in the program concerning a dedicated launch crew for “B” vehicles. However, the idea
never materialized due to resource constraints and the conscious effort to synergize the expertise and experience of the Titan IV “A” team. To insure that the “A” team could process and
launch the “B” bird, a special effort / process was exercised to ensure that all launch base
activities were covered. This exercise resulted in the creation of the Launch Operations Management Plan (LOMP). The LOMP was a living document that addressed the various processes the launch base team would use to assemble, test, checkout, and launch the new
system. The LOMP was declared complete after the launch management team had reviewed
all applicable processes and found them acceptable for “B” vehicle processing and launch. A

fishbone analysis was used to describe each of the processes that would require review and
assessment. The fishbone(s) were dynamic and could change as the team better understood
the overall situation. Five versions of the fishbone evolved. Each bone of the LOMP was evaluated for documentation (procedures and command media), changes from “A” vehicle processing, and readiness for the team to do “B” vehicles. If the team was not ready, a corrective action
plan was generated and tracked to completion. The “completed” LOMP guaranteed that the
team was ready to process and launch the “B” vehicle. As a side to this effort to validate process capability, many processes were actually improved, resulting in or rather like a “process
proofing”.
LESSON LEARNED #8.
There is value, for new launch systems, in systematically reviewing all the dimensions of bringing a new launch capability on-line. If possible, the majority of this effort should take place prior
to vehicle processing but continue through the early processing of the flight hardware.

Summary:
The successful launch of the Cassini mission culminated a significant effort on the part of many
people. This paper has described the key lessons learned from the launch base perspective.
By no means is this paper a complete description of the story of the first Titan IVB and the
development of the capability at the launch base. Nor does it describe the extraordinary design
and development efforts at Lockheed Martin Astronautics (LMA) -Denver. Further, this paper
was intended to summarize the major lessons learned at the launch base that the author believes would be applicable to any new major launch system that is coming on-line. It is clear that
Pathfinder efforts are worth the cost. Another recurring theme, that drove the success of this
effort, was early preparation (even with requirements in the early stage of development) and
continual coordination with the multiple members of the team required for a major space launch.

The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Lockheed Martin Astronautics

